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Abstract
After any therapy, when symptoms improve, healthcare providers (and patients) are tempted to
award credit to treatment. Over time, a particular treatment can seem so undeniably helpful that
scientific verification of efficacy is judged an inconvenient waste of time and resources.
Unfortunately, practitioners' accumulated, day-to-day, informal impressions of diagnostic reliability
and clinical efficacy are of limited value. To help clarify why even treatments entirely lacking in
direct effect can seem helpful, I will explain why real signs and symptoms often improve,
independent of treatment. Then, I will detail quirks of human perception, interpretation, and
memory that often make symptoms seem improved, when they are not. I conclude that healthcare
will grow to full potential only when judgments of clinical efficacy routinely are based in properly
scientific, placebo-controlled, outcome analysis.
Why do ineffective treatments seem helpful?: A 
brief review
"Much the greater part of medicine's useful and
practical knowledge... derives not from physicians'
observations of patients at the bedside but from the
laboratories of the natural sciences, physics, and
engineering"[1].
An average day at the office: A patient presents with symp-
toms of a common, nonchronic malady. In your practice,
you have observed this problem respond to a particular
treatment protocol, and you manage the case accordingly.
When your patient returns for follow up, symptoms are
improved. Again, it seems your treatment has been effec-
tive.
In this contrived account, awarding credit to treatment
seems reasonable, but is it? All we have are your personal,
clinical impressions of cause and effect. For any particular
case, your bedside experience and knowledge of an indi-
vidual patient may inform diagnostic and treatment deci-
sions, but are they likely to be enough?
Often, practitioners are tempted to base clinical convic-
tions in personal experience. Controlled (scientific) verifi-
cation of apparent efficacy can seem a bothersome hurdle.
In fact, science sometimes seems to offer only a period at
the end of a confident therapeutic sentence, already writ-
ten. Unfortunately for those judging efficacy, symptoms
can improve for many reasons unrelated to treatment.
Even less-well understood by patients or practitioners,
there are many reasons that symptoms may seem
improved, when they are not. This assortment of causal
possibilities renders casual, uncontrolled appraisals of
clinical efficacy unreliable. In material that follows, I will
show why:
1) clinical merits of one or more of your favored ther-
apies might be open to question;
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2) outcome studies must be designed and interpreted
with caution;
3) randomized, placebo-controlled trials are the foun-
dation of modern healthcare [2];
4) many medical journals (including this one) publish
few case reports;
5) demonstrably valueless "alternative" and "comple-
mentary" approaches to healthcare are so popular;
and
6) many alternative regimes (e.g., acupuncture, reflex-
ology, and cranial osteopathy) seem effective against a
plethora of health problems (from constipation and
autism to Down Syndrome [3]) with numerous differ-
ent biological foundations [3-5].
As we will see, discomfort engendered by opinions at odds
with one's own can derail one's best intentions of reach-
ing the truth. Although nothing in this review is, to my
knowledge, new or controversial, some ideas expressed
may conflict with views you already hold. If you give this
review a thorough reading, and judge it incomplete (or
even mistaken, in some regards), please consider publish-
ing a counterview.
History of Healthcare
"The history of medicine has never been a particu-
larly attractive subject... virtually anything that
could be thought up for the treatment of disease was
tried and, once tried, lasted decades or even centu-
ries before being given up. It was, in retrospect, the
most frivolous and irresponsible kind of human
experimentation, based on nothing but trial and
error and usually resulting in precisely that
sequence." [[6](p159)]
For as long as humans have struggled to heal other
humans, confident practitioners (and trusting patients)
have relied upon untold numbers of potions and proce-
dures, shown (eventually) to be without value [7,8].
For millennia, to combat evil spirits or imbalance in
their patients' four humors, caring, confident practi-
tioner's drained copious quantities of blood [9]. This
rarely led to desirable outcomes [8], and sometimes
resulted in death [10].
For millennia, to repair imbalance or interruption of
their patients' vital air or energy (chi or qi; pro-
nounced "chee"), concerned healers have adminis-
tered "traditional Chinese medicine." Herbal
treatments, Quigong, acupuncture, moxibustion,
pulse diagnoses, and an array of other folk medical
therapies: all offered with conviction--and almost all
have proven to be biologically vacuous [11,12].
For some maladies, healers have exploited environ-
mental features superficially similar to symptoms. For
example, yellow skin and eyes of jaundice may
respond to a sip of water mixed with hair from a red
bull [[13,14](Ch.III, Sec.2, p6)]. A tumor may "dry
up" and disappear if a patient's neck is draped with
part of a root from a specific plant, while the remain-
der is dried in smoke from an adjacent fire
[[13,14](Ch.III, Sec.2, p7)]. Such practices draw their
power from the precept "like cures like." This "doc-
trine of similarity" has been with us throughout
recorded history. It provides much of the cognitive
scaffold for magical thinking, in general [[13-
16](p16)], and healthcare has suffered its share of
embarrassing encounters.
Medical historians have recognized this lengthy, medical
childhood of guesswork and therapeutic failure for what
it was: a well-intentioned but desperately ill-informed
struggle of our prescientific past [[6](p158-175), [7](p1-
27),[8]]. For thousands of years, practitioners adminis-
tered therapies, monitored symptoms, and then pro-
claimed their efforts beneficial. Patients considered their
post-treatment perceptions, and agreed. Now we know,
both practitioners and patients often were wrong. What-
ever treatment was engaged, direct, positive effects on
patient health probably were rare [[7](p1-27),[8]].
This lengthy record of misplaced medical confidence has
done little to halt similar, 21st century errors in judgment.
That is, universal acceptance of the evidence-based health-
care paradigm has faltered. Patients--and many practition-
ers--remain shackled by the same confounding factors
that randomized trials, meta-analyses, and the Cochrane
Collaboration [17] were designed to circumvent.
Use of some irrational practices has diminished, and rest
harmlessly in the dust-bin of medical history (e.g., the
cure-all of bloodletting). However, well-meaning practi-
tioners still engage scientifically undetectable body ener-
gies of traditional Chinese medicine [11,12] and
therapeutic touch [18]. Millions still cling to the long-dis-
credited doctrine of similarities: are you familiar with
homeopathy?
Why does faith in personal clinical experience persist,
given its clear and protracted reputation for unreliability
[7](p1-27)[8,19]? I consider three related components to
this deductive malfunction:Chiropractic & Osteopathy 2009, 17:10 http://www.chiroandosteo.com/content/17/1/10
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I. due to natural history of disease, regression to the
mean, and the placebo effect, real signs and symptoms
often improve--with or without treatment;
II. patients and practitioners often convince them-
selves that treatment was effective--when it was not
(due to confirmation bias and other human cognitive
imperfections); and
III. personal evaluation of efficacy is quick and con-
vincing, but properly controlled, scientific determina-
tions can be slow, complex, and costly.
I. Signs and symptoms improve, though 
treatment is without effect
Between initiation of therapy and any follow-up assess-
ment, real, measurable improvement of symptoms often
occurs--even if treatment is completely ineffective. How
does this happen? Determining that partial credit should
go to one's treatment requires prior elimination of other
possibilities.
Natural history of disease
Mammals have evolved immune systems, and other effec-
tive mechanisms for self-repair. Consequently, biologi-
cally real symptoms of disorder commonly diminish--no
matter how (or whether) they are treated. Over time, a dis-
ease that naturally comes and goes may even provide
patients and practitioners with numerous opportunities to
assume--erroneously--that a treatment has been effective
[20].
Regression to the mean
Despite its statistically high-sounding label, regression to
the mean is easily understood. Many clinical signs and
symptoms, when measured through time, will be dis-
persed around a mean. Typically, patients seek care when
symptomatic burdens of their dysfunction are greater than
average. With or without treatment, subsequent measures
of such properties likely will be closer to average (show
improvement), for purely statistical reasons [21]. In fact,
some researchers [22] believe that regression to the mean
is responsible for most apparent improvements mistak-
enly assigned to the placebo effect. In other words, treat-
ments often are not as powerful as we are inclined to
believe, and the placebo effect isn't either.
Placebo effect
Patients' interpretations of clinical encounters can inspire
genuine health improvements [23,24](p127-165), [25-
28](p25-43), [29-31]]. A practitioner's white coat, confi-
dent bearing, and gentle touch; a nurse's smile; a diploma
covered wall; all can influence health-related physiology.
These aspects of clinical outcomes, produced by the psy-
chosocial context of any treatment (real or "placebo"), are
called "placebo effects." Placebo-based improvements are
real and important, but often are considered (instead) to
be direct, clinical effects of treatment; this can only retard
progress toward predictably, uniformly effective health-
care.
Influences on health coincident with (but independent of) 
particular treatment
Initiative and frustration motivating patients to visit a par-
ticular healthcare provider may inspire other healthful
actions, as well (e.g., behaviors leading to better diet,
more sleep, more exercise, less stress, and therapies/med-
ications supplied by other practitioners).
Post Hoc, Ergo Propter Hoc
Not only can isolating real causes for clinical outcomes be
a challenge, but also we seem predisposed to faulty reason-
ing. Why is credit so often (and erroneously) awarded to
direct effect of a treatment, when it is the disease's natural
history, regression to the mean, or a placebo effect that
has brought real recovery?
In determining cause/effect relationships, a useful, cogni-
tive rule-of-thumb takes the form: if event B follows event
A, then B was caused by A. However, although cause does
precede effect, hasty selection from among numerous pre-
ceding events is unwise. Nonetheless, the human procliv-
ity to careless confidence in the temporal relationship
between cause and effect is so strong that it long has been
a subject of scholarly discourse. This cognitive flaw even
has its own Latin label: post hoc, ergo propter hoc ("after this,
therefore because of this"). In a medical context, because
real improvements often follow even an ineffective treat-
ment, the treatment often is awarded credit when none is
deserved. When practitioners and patients assume that
improvements following treatment resulted directly from
treatment, they often are being victimized by this cogni-
tive fallacy.
II. Symptoms do not improve, but seem to
Our abilities to perceive, interpret, and remember
moment-to-moment experiences are limited [32-35]. In
fact, we can be expected to mishandle some kinds of
input. These limits to critical thinking are as likely to
impair accurate comprehension of healthcare outcomes
as they are any other life event. For example, the "post hoc,
ergo propter hoc" fallacy often short-circuits critical
thought, through the psychological phenomenon of
"confirmation bias."
Confirmation bias
"People sometimes see ... patterns for which they
are looking, regardless of whether the patterns are
really there." [[35](p181)]Chiropractic & Osteopathy 2009, 17:10 http://www.chiroandosteo.com/content/17/1/10
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"A man hears what he wants to hear, and disre-
gards the rest." [36]
In 1951, Dartmouth College and Princeton University
played a hard-fought game of (American) football, with
penalties, animosity, and broken bones, in profusion.
Subsequently, students from both campuses viewed a film
of the entire game, and were asked to judge blame for the
two teams' hostile behavior. Students from both schools
assigned more guilt to members of the other team than
suggested by recorded statistics [37]. Evidently, coincident
with university affiliation, indoctrination, and allegiance,
students expected members of their own team (who were,
after all, the "good guys") to behave themselves. This
motivated students to watch the other team more care-
fully, and they saw what they expected to see. Probably,
these students' judgment was compromised by "confirma-
tion bias" [35], the natural human inclination to gather,
interpret, or remember information in ways that support
preexisting desires or expectations [35,38].
Confirmation bias as a selective advantage
Many factors contribute to the mix of cognitive and
behavioral phenomena labeled "confirmation bias" [35].
Though usually considered a cognitive flaw, confirmation
bias may have been useful in environments of our evolu-
tionary past. Seeking factual certainty at every life juncture
may have been selectively unwise. Instead, certain time-
saving, cognitive rules-of-thumb may have increased
reproductive fitness [34,39]. Suppose one of your direct
ancestors, while digging tubers, heard a stick break behind
her. Your existence today might depend on her reaction:
would you rather she exercised confirmation bias (honor-
ing her triggered fear of predators with a jump to the near-
est tree), or verified danger before burning precious
calories?
Confirmation bias and cognitive dissonance
Cognitive dissonance [40] is "an unpleasant psychologi-
cal state resulting from inconsistency between two or
more elements in a cognitive system" [38]. Our proclivity
to confirmation bias can be partly explained by our incli-
nation to avoid cognitive dissonance.
By late 1954, Dorothy Martin was convinced a cata-
clysmic flood soon would inundate North America,
and perhaps the entire world [41]. Fortunately for
Dorothy and devoted Chicago-area converts to this
parareligious conviction, technologically advanced
beings of planet Clarion had (telepathically) promised
safety. Prior to the December 21 reckoning, believers
would be transported to another planet (or other safe
place), in what we would call a "flying saucer."
December 21, 1954 came ... and went ... without
aliens, space ships, or watery devastation. Did Dor-
othy and cohorts desist with proclamations of extra-
terrestrial beings and cosmic agendas? A few did.
Most, however, rationalized the flood's absence,
tweaked their odd convictions, and then proselytized
with renewed vigor. That is, when facts diverged from
fantasy, their faith held firm. Why?
Preparing for departure, many believers willingly had
relinquished all belongings, and publicly had champi-
oned a bizarre view of reality. When predicted destruc-
tion and salvation failed to materialize, psychological
options were few. Admitting they had abandoned pos-
sessions and reputations to a delusion would bring
regret and embarrassment. Instead, avid believers
apparently circumvented dissonant feelings of per-
sonal failure and shame by altering the fantasy to per-
mit continued--even expanded--faith.
This is one of the earliest, now classical, published reports
of how psychological discomforts of cognitive dissonance
can lead individuals to rationalize and strengthen beliefs,
rather than confront reality.
Confirmation bias and healthcare
Whatever its evolutionary and psychological roots, how
does confirmation bias manifest in a patient's determina-
tion of whether a treatment has been helpful?
Desire
We desire treatment success because illness is unpleas-
ant. If measurable signs/symptoms do not subside
after treatment, patients can reduce at least their psy-
chological burden by interpreting ambiguous symp-
toms positively, and by reporting (and believing) they
feel better. We also may desire treatment success
because failure could suggest poor (even foolish)
investment of time and money. The temptation to
deflect that dissonant reality (by confirming success,
without evidence) may be substantial. This may be
especially true if (in retrospect) the treatment now
seems unusual--as many alternative remedies might.
Expectation
A patient's personal experience with, or knowledge of,
a particular treatment may lead to an apparently
informed expectation of therapeutic success. Trust in
the healthcare system, a particular practitioner, or the
body's natural healing abilities, also may warrant opti-
mism. Perhaps to avoid cognitive dissonance that can
come with being wrong, such expectations may lead
patients to conclude that a particular therapeutic over-
ture has had direct, positive results, when it has not.Chiropractic & Osteopathy 2009, 17:10 http://www.chiroandosteo.com/content/17/1/10
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Likewise, under some circumstances, we may be
biased to confirm desires and expectations of others,
because social norms seem to require it. Suppose a
patient perceives her practitioner as a good healer
(smart, well-trained, hard-working, confident, and
compassionate). Under such circumstances, a social
"norm of reciprocity" [32] embodied in "demand
characteristics" [42] of a therapeutic encounter, may
persuade her to rationalize treatment success. That is,
she may report (and believe) that treatment was help-
ful--not because it was, but because her perception of
her role as "patient" demands it of her.
Patients can avert psychological conflicts accompanying
treatment failures (even surgical: [43]) by interpreting
clinical findings and feelings optimistically, and presum-
ing symptom relief. In addition, because treatment pre-
cedes imagined healing, the "after this, therefore because
of this" fallacy helps justify assignment of (undeserved)
credit to the treatment. Given all of these biasing predis-
positions, perhaps we should be surprised if patients did
not fall prey to confirmation bias.
Practitioners also are victims of confirmation bias; cogni-
tive dissonance; norms of reciprocity; the post hoc, ergo
propter hoc fallacy; and other limits on the quality of
human cognition [[19,35](p189,192-3),[44,45]]. For
example: a practitioner's long, frequent, committed use of
a particular technique or medication may put both profes-
sional and personal esteem "on the line." Thus, practi-
tioners are at risk of dissonance every time earlier
judgments of efficacy are reconsidered. Likewise, practi-
tioners may be biased to confirm success--because their
role as healer (rather than objective evidence) demands it.
Unconscious temptations for practitioners to confirm
desired/expected clinical outcomes may be as great as for
patients.
Confirmation bias and self-fulfilling prophecy
After treatment, confident practitioners often query
patients in ways that elicit answers validating practition-
ers' optimism, confirming hopes and expectations of both
[46].
1) Practitioners sometimes achieve genuine treatment
success. In addition, regression to the mean, placebo
effects, confirmation bias, and the tendency for mala-
dies to improve on their own lead to numerous mis-
taken impressions of efficacy. With so much perceived
clinical triumph "under their belts," practitioners
often begin therapeutic encounters expecting efficacy.
2) Expectations of success can lead practitioners
(unknowingly) to ask questions, at follow-up, that
guide patients to confirm treatment success, whatever
their impressions before being questioned [46].
3) Hearing from patients what they expected, practi-
tioners may become even more confident.
4) Perceiving practitioners' growing pleasure with
apparent success, patients may become even more cer-
tain treatment was effective.
In this way, "self-fulfilling prophecies" [47,48] are interac-
tively constructed by practitioners and patients. Not only
can both reach erroneous conclusions on treatment suc-
cess, but under many circumstances, they will create this
shared delusion, together.
For many evolutionary, motivational, and cognitive rea-
sons, humans are naturally disposed to confirmation bias.
We are prone to observe, interpret, and remember events
and information in ways that affirm both desires and
expectations. In the context of healthcare, there are many
reasons for both patients and practitioners to desire and
expect treatment success, often prompting impressions
that a treatment has been effective--when it has not.
Peripheral factors that can relieve perceived symptoms
Numerous features of daily life, in general, can serve as
psychological palliatives. In particular, a patient's interac-
tion with one or more elements of the healthcare commu-
nity may lead to reduced anxiety; feelings of increased
control; or a positive, more realistic conception of the
problem [32]. Any of these may inspire a patient to report
symptom improvements--in the absence of real, physio-
logical/anatomical treatment-related changes.
No matter how emphatically they praise you, patients'
reports may tell you little about efficacy. Whatever your
confidence that you have interpreted clinical outcomes
with detachment, self-interest and limits of cognition may
preclude you from doing so.
Summary
Occasionally, purposeful clinical treatment leads directly
to symptom improvement. More often, patients and prac-
titioners award credit to a particular therapy when healing
is unrelated (or even imaginary). Independent of any spe-
cific treatment, measurable signs and symptoms often
improve, due to the self-correcting course of many dis-
eases; regression to the mean; placebo effects; and other
factors coincident with (but directly unrelated to) treat-
ment. Even more worrisome, symptom improvement
may be only imagined, consequent to various forms of
confirmation bias, and peripheral factors leading to psy-
chological palliation.Chiropractic & Osteopathy 2009, 17:10 http://www.chiroandosteo.com/content/17/1/10
Page 6 of 7
(page number not for citation purposes)
Any one of these confounding factors, by itself, renders
uncontrolled judgments of direct clinical efficacy unrelia-
ble. Taken together, their influence is hard to overstate.
When you treat a patient, apparent outcomes often will be
influenced by real, physiological changes directly unre-
lated to treatment, and various forms of wishful thinking.
Not only can these factors lead to erroneous perception of
efficacy, but they should be expected to.
Only after formally controlled observations (limiting
such biases) can practitioners be confident that clinical
value of a treatment may have been accurately and reliably
measured. A "no treatment" group helps control for a dis-
ease's natural history, regression to the mean, and some
other factors leading to real change (in the absence of
treatment). Remaining unrestrained will be real effects of
placebos, and imaginary healing deriving from confirma-
tion bias and other psychological influences. For these,
inclusion of a sham treatment group offers the only hope
of control. Only with good sham treatment, adequate
sample size, random assignment of patients to study
groups, and other precautions can direct effects of treat-
ment (if any) be measured.
Independent of direct, effective, therapeutic support,
patients often come to feel better. This is not trivial, but
ethics of all healing professions demand that such effects
not be falsely credited to specific treatments.
I hope I have engendered appreciation, even enthusiasm,
for the importance of rigorously controlled clinical obser-
vation. Without science, healthcare still would involve lit-
tle more than applying tourniquets, setting bones, and
administering placebos. After many centuries as socially
sanctioned, organized magical thinking, healthcare has
been transformed by scientific inquiry into a powerful
service profession. In fact, science has become integral to
everything healthcare providers do. If you see patients, I
hope you now will be suspicious about all assumptions of
therapeutic success, including your own.
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